The proposed condition would be something like (v) g bears an appropriate relation to a possible intuition (pure or empirical).
As stated, this is too vague: if the ground of assent, g, just is an intuition, or is partly constituted by intuition, then the condition is presumably met. But what other relations to intuition count as "appropriate"? Can we make knowledge-preserving inferences from what we do intuit to what we could intuit? Or to unobservables? What about inferences from a structural feature of intuition to its transcendental conditions -do those relations count as appropriate? What does "givenness" amount to here, and why is intuition so important -isn't the relevant thing just the character of the justifying ground, no matter what its source? In other words, why do we need a condition like (v) if we've already got (i)?
I will return to these questions below. For now, it is worth noting that (v) as stated won't do as a necessary condition on knowledge simpliciter. For Kant's claim in the quotation here is about cognition (Erkenntnis) rather than knowledge (Wissen), and elsewhere he explicitly allows that there is some knowledge that is not based in cognition or related to possible intuition in any interesting way. For example, well-formed analytic judgments allow us "to know what lies in the concept" (wissen, was in seinem Begriffe liegt) (A259/B315), but aren't based in intuitions of the objects of the concepts (I don't have to perceive any bachelors in order to know that they're all male). In speculative contexts, moreover, some of the concepts will pick out things-in-themselves (God, the soul, free wills, monads, etc.) -i.e., supersensibles of which we can't have intuition. But surely Kant must allow (under threat of performative contradiction, given all his lectures on metaphysics and philosophical theology) that we have some analytic knowledge of their contents.
Similarly, we might know about a domain of things in a wholly negative fashion without having intuition of those things -consider here the assent that things-inthemselves are not in space and time. The objectively sufficient grounds of such knowledge might be Kant's transcendental arguments establishing that space and time are the mere forms of our receptive sensible intuition, together with the fact that things-inthemselves are, by definition, supersensible (see B307). As we will see below, Kant suggests in places that we have positive but very general knowledge about such thingsthat things-in-themselves exist and ground appearances, for example . But any such negative or very general positive knowledge about things-inthemselves will not based in cognition or intuition of those things (see B149).
There is more to be said about these cases, but this suggests that, for Kant, there is some knowledge that is not related to actual or possible intuition in an epistemically significant way. It also emphasizes the need to find a revised version of (v) that is adequate to such cases and yet allows us to preserve a unified account of Kantian knowledge. Ideally, the revised version would also explain Kant's claims about the importance of intuition as well as his prohibition on synthetic knowledge-claims about the positive characteristics of specific things-in-themselves.
own, nor will they accept a bald stipulation that concepts without a connection to possible intuitions have no epistemic use. Some commentators seem willing to take the demand for intuitional "matter" here as indicative of a broadly empiricist commitment that Kant adopted after Hume woke him from his slumbers, and leave it at that. 5 But why did he go in that direction? What was the root concern? Why must our concepts, as well as the assents that involve them, be related in some way to intuition? And, again, which kinds of relation are appropriate?
4 Regarding his own theistic proof from 1763, for instance, the critical Kant says that "this proof can in no way be refuted (allein widerleget kann er auf keine Weise werden), because it has its ground in the nature of human reason. For my reason makes it absolutely necessary for me to accept (annehmen) a being which is the ground of everything possible, because otherwise I would be unable to cognize (erkennen) what in general the possibility of something consists in." (28:1034). The "acceptance" here is what he calls, in the Canon, "doctrinal belief" (see below for more discussion). 5 A.W. Moore points out that Kant first uses the "awakening" metaphor in connection with Hume here in the Discipline at A764/B792 (Moore 2010).
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A related line of thought is this: in order to claim knowledge about any object at all, we have to have some sort of mental grasp of or reference to that object. Perhaps this is what Kant means when he repeatedly demands that objects be "given" to the mind and that concepts without intuitions are "without sense or reference" (A155-6/B194-5; A721/B729). But again, why must the "giving" occur by way of a relation to actual or possible intuitions, rather than by simply generating and entertaining concepts? When
Descartes entertains the idea of God or an immaterial soul in Meditations, he surely has some sort of mental grasp of what he is discussing. But then why aren't those things "given" to him in the relevant sense? To insist that mental "givenness" just has to go by way of a connection to intuition again looks merely stipulative.
I think we can go beyond metaphors and stipulations by viewing Kant's prohibition on synthetic knowledge of particular supersensibles as arising more organically out of his lifelong reckoning with his rationalist predecessors. Here's the story in brief 6 : in the 1760's, Kant spied a metaphysical difference between "logical" possibility and real possibility; he also saw the related point that there can be "real opposition" (reale Entgegensetzung) or "real repugnance" (Realrepugnanz) between logically consistent positive predicates. In the "Negative Magnitudes" (NM) essay of 1762, for instance, he cites the example of two equally powerful winds blowing from opposed directions on a sail: they "cancel out" (aufheben) one another, and the ship remains at rest (NM 2:171, p. 211 By the time of the Critique, Kant regarded the rationalists' neglect of these nonlogical constraints on possibility as a serious mistake. In the "Phenomena/Noumena" chapter, for example, he points out that the real possibility of something cannot be established by mere thinking:
That the not-being of a thing does not contradict itself is a lame appeal to a logical condition, which is certainly necessary for the concept but far from sufficient for real possibility. (A244/B302, my emphasis)
He laments in the Amphiboly that with respect to the concept of a supreme being, for instance, the rationalists find it not merely possible but also natural to unite all reality in one being without any worry about opposition, since they do not recognize any opposition except
The mistake here is modal: when Leibniz and Wolff seek to demonstrate the existence of a supreme being through armchair speculation, they just presume, as Kant puts it in a lecture, that they have "insight (Einsicht) into whether all realities could be united together in one object (Objekt), and hence into how God is possible" (LRel 28:1025f., pp.
368-9, my emphasis). 7 But, again, if there are non-logical, real constraints on possibility 7 Other cases of predicate-canceling real impossibility are found in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (MF). For instance, "two motions" that are "combined in precisely opposite directions in one and the same point" are such that they cancel the entire subject to which they are ascribed: "[R]epresenting two such motions at the same time in exactly the same point within one and the same space would be impossible,
-constraints that can't reliably be tracked via mere thought -then that presumption looks hasty. For all we know, in such a speculative context, the concept includes predicates that are really opposed in such a way as to cancel out the subject itself -that is, to make it really impossible.
It is in direct response to these metaphysical and epistemological concerns about rationalist modal theory, I submit, that Kant develops his fifth epistemic condition. "I can think whatever I like," he says in the B-Preface, as long as I do not contradict myself, i.e., as long as my concept is a possible thought, even if I cannot give any assurance as to whether or not there is a corresponding object [Objekt] somewhere within the sum total of all [real] possibilities… [But] to cognize an object, it is required that I be able to prove its
[real] possibility (whether by the testimony of experience from its actuality or a
This passage is focused on cognition, but the few kinds of knowledge that are not based in cognition can easily meet this modal condition. In analytic contexts, the relevant "objects" are just the concepts we are analyzing, 8 so if we can "prove" that the concepts themselves are actual (by being aware that we have them), then we can a fortiori prove that they (though not necessarily their objects) are really possible.
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If the synthetic but very general assent that things-in-themselves exist and ground appearances counts as knowledge, then we can find "proof" of their (or its) real possibility in the fact that their (its) actual existence is a condition of the existence of any and thus so would the case of such a composition of motions itself" (MF 4:491, . Another example: a material being "is impossible if it has mere attractive forces without repulsive forces," and that this impossibility has its basis in "the essence of matter" rather than in a logical contradiction (MF 4:511, p. 222). 8 "For an analytic assertion takes the understanding no further, and since it is occupied only with that which is already thought in the concept, it leaves it undecided whether the concept even has any relation to objects […] ; it is enough for [the subject] to know (wissen) what lies in the concept; he is indifferent to what the concept might pertain to" (A 258-9/B 314). 9 "That the concept (thought) is possible is not an issue; the issue is rather whether it relates to an object and therefore signifies anything" (B 302-3, note).
appearances at all. In the Preface, Kant seems to go this direction: he says it would be "absurd" for there to be appearances without there also being something that appears, i.e.
something that grounds those appearances (Bxxvi). In the Prolegomena, he says, similarly:
The understanding, just by the fact that it accepts appearances, also admits to the existence of things in themselves, and to that extent we can say that the representation of such beings as underlie the appearances, hence of mere intelligible beings, is not merely permitted but also unavoidable. (4:315, p.
107; see also 4:355, p. 144)
Commentators disagree about whether this is supposed to be self-evident, or a conceptual truth, or a quick deductive inference, but many follow Erich Adickes in holding that it provides a "proof" of the actuality (and thus real possibility) of noumenal grounds taken collectively, though not of any specific, determinate thing (monad, deity, soul, etc.) among them. 10 Any negative knowledge about the same objects, such as that things-inthemselves are not in space and time, would presumably be based on the same "proof"
as well as Kant's transcendental reflections about the nature of space and time.
Since the modal condition here obviously applies to all knowledge that is based in cognition and, as we have seen, to the few kinds of non-cognitional knowledge that Kant seems to allow, it is a nice candidate for a revised version of the fifth condition on knowledge. Here is a first stab:
(v*): S is in a position to prove the real possibility of the objects referred to in p. 10 Adickes took this belief in the existence of things in themselves to be simply "self-evident" for Kant (see Adickes 1924 and the extensive discussion of it in Bird 2006, ch. 23) . Some commentators want to avoid interpreting this or any other text as licensing a synthetic existence-claim about things-in-themselves (see Bird 2006, 42-44, 559-63; O'Shea 2012, 106-115) . If they are right, then the modal condition I'm developing here would be in even better shape, since cognition is clearly governed by a modal condition for Kant.
A remaining problem with this is that we clearly know, about impossible objects, that they are impossible. For instance, we know that intersecting parallel lines cannot exist.
Kant says that in such cases "the impossibility rests not on the concept itself but on its construction in space, i.e., on the conditions of space and its determinations […]" (A220-1/B268; cf. A224/B271). This indicates that the modality in such a case is real rather than merely logical, and that the "proof of possibility" that Kant has in mind is something more like proof of whether or not the objects referred to are really possible (think of phrases like "prove your mettle" or "proof of the pudding" -we test for the presence of a certain property rather than proving that the property is positively there). 11 This suggests the following revision:
(v**) for any object referred to in p, if it is really possible then S is in a position to prove its real possibility, and if it is really impossible then S is in a position to prove its real impossibility.
More work would be required to go beyond propositions with atomic structure, 12 but for now I propose to take (v**) as a good approximation of Kant's fifth condition on knowledge.
D. Possibility and the Postulates
At this point, the obvious question is: well, what sort of "proof" or "justification" of real possibility is available? Three different strategies emerge in Kant's discussions in the Discipline and, more expansively, in the "Postulates of Empirical Thought" (the chapter 11 Thanks to Erica Shumener for discussion here. 12 We would need to know, for instance, about knowledge of (a) conditionals (I can know that "if there are unicorns, then there are horns" is true without proving that unicorns are really possible), (b) negations (I can know that "it's not the case that there is a golden mountain in the room" without proving that golden mountains are really possible or impossible) and (c) disjunctions (I can know that "I am writing a paper or God is a deceiver" without proving that God is really possible). My sense is that (a) can be assimilated to conceptual or broadly analytic knowledge that is about the concepts rather than the objects of those concept, (b) can be interpreted as about the room and the items in it, rather than about the golden mountain, and in (c) only the disjunct that makes the entire disjunction true has to meet the modal condition. Thanks to Karen Bennett, Don Garrett, Ted Sider, and Eric Watkins for asking about these kinds of cases.
on modality).
First strategy: appeal to actuality
According to Locke, if we propose to combine some qualities in the complex idea of some substance or kind, we must actually experience the individual qualities and their combination. Without such actual experience, according to Locke, we can't be sure that the qualities are not "in-co-existent" (Locke's term: Essay 4.3.12). This is part of what leads him to the doctrine that things may have real essences that ground the "strict union"
of all sorts of qualities that we haven't experienced at all -or haven't experienced together -but that a good empiricist will restrict her knowledge-claims to propositions about nominal essences that contain qualities which "we can be sure are, or are not, inconsistent in Nature." And the only way she can be sure of that is by appeal to "Experience and sensible Observation" (Essay 4.4.12).
In places, Kant sounds downright Lockean on this question:
In a word, all of these concepts could not be vouched for ( The appeal to intuition works in some a priori contexts as well: in the Discipline, Kant emphasizes that many mathematical judgments satisfy the modal condition by appealing to intuitive "constructions" of their objects in pure intuition. Such construction proves their actuality, and that trivially entails their real possibility (see A718/B746). Telepathy, in particular, seems like a hard case: the existence of such a faculty is clearly compatible with the formal axioms of space and time, and it is hard to see how it would be ruled out by the principles of the understanding (such as the Analogies).
[Empirical necessity:] That whose connection with the actual is determined according to universal conditions (bestimmt nach allgemeinen Bedingungen) on experience is (i.e. exists) necessarily. (A218 /B266)
The "universal conditions on experience" are thicker or more "particular" than the merely formal conditions referred to in the definition of possibility, as Kant's discussion goes on to indicate. Any object (or change of state) that is connected to actual events via the formal conditions or the much more particular "empirical laws of causality" counts as necessary in this sense (see A 227/B 280). It thus seems appropriate to call this kind of necessity empirical. We can then define a counterpart conception of possibility:
Empirical possibility: Something is empirically possible iff it is not empirically necessary that it is not the case. In other words, an object or event is empirically possible iff its existence agrees with the universal conditions on experience -i.e.
the formal conditions plus the particular laws and preceding actual events. 18 Consider in this connection Kant's discussion of why we can cognize the existence of unobservable "magnetic matter" at A226/B273.
It's often wise to go for a middle way in Kant interpretation. Here an attractive thing to say (I submit) is that Kant has in mind what we now call a positive coherence relation when he speaks of "agreement with" or "conformity to" experience and its known laws. It's not merely that the possibility of the objects referred to is consistent with our background knowledge of nature, but it's not that it is entailed by it either.
Rather, there are positive coherence relations between the claim that such items are possible and our 19 background knowledge of the way the world works. As Kant says at A537/B565 "appearances…are…mere representations, which cohere according to empirical laws" [Erscheinungen...sind…bloße Vorstellungen, die nach empirischen
Gesetzen zusammenhängen]. In other words:
Third Strategy**: S is in a position to prove the real possibility of an object if S is in a position to prove that its possible existence positively coheres with S's background knowledge of nature and its laws.
Talk of "proof" may sound too ambitious here, but recall that elsewhere Kant is willing to use weaker expressions such as "justify the possibility" (A259/B315). For the vast majority of our synthetic knowledge, I think this strategy describes the way the modal condition in (v**) is satisfied.
E. Coherence and the Architectonic
It is not unusual for coherentist accounts of a particular item of knowledge to make reference to other pieces of a subject's background knowledge. Still, in order to flesh out the proposal just sketched, we'd need to say more about what Kant takes positive coherence to consist in. My suggestion, left undeveloped here, is that this is where Kant's discussion of the importance of "systematicity" in the Architectonic (as well as the Appendix to the Dialectic and the third Critique) plays a crucial role. To know a proposition involves not just having probabilistic grounds for it and being able to cite those grounds when one assents to it. Rather, one also has to be justified in holding that the real possibility of the objects it refers to positively coheres with one's background knowledge. 20 The goal is to form an edifice (here Kant returns to his architectural metaphor) in which all the assents are purposively united with each other as members of a whole in a system of human cognition, and allow for an architectonic to all human knowledge… (A835/B863) This is not a mere scientific ideal -as we have seen, Kant's view is that without at least some sense of the background system, we can have "no coherent use of the understanding, and, lacking that, no sufficient mark of empirical truth; thus in regards to the latter we must presuppose the systematic unity of nature as objectively valid and necessary" (A651/B679).
I have argued that the modal condition on knowledge, interpreted in the manner of (v**) above, underwrites Kant's frequent appeals to the need for a relation to possible intuition, for objectively real (as opposed to "empty") concepts, and for the "givenness" of objects. I have also suggested that (v**) should be read along the lines of (Third Strategy**) above: for S to be in a position to "prove" that an object is really possible is for S to be able to justifiably claim that its real possibility positively coheres with her background knowledge of nature and its laws.
Here's a final case to consider: suppose you infer from the harmonious and fecund character of the natural laws as a whole to the existence of a supersensible worldauthor. Kant seems to regard such inferences as sound, and as providing probabilistic The question indicates that (Third Strategy**) has to be read as invoking our background knowledge of the content of the laws that take the world from one state to the next. In other words, when Kant says we should look to the "universal conditions" on experience as our instructress in systematizing our assents, he is talking not about secondorder features of the laws themselves (their elegance, simplicity, etc., taken as a set), but about what the laws say regarding which event-types that follow other event-types.
Assent to the existence of the world-author fails to satisfy (v**) in this way, then, because we are never in a position to show that there are formal or particular laws whose specific content makes the possibility of a spiritual author of the world seem more or less likely. We are simply ignorant of the real modal status of such a being, and so the strongest attitude we can take towards it is, as Kant explicitly tells us in the Canon, a form of belief -i.e., "doctrinal belief" (doktrinale Glaube) (A826/B854).
For similar reasons, we also can't establish positive coherence between our background knowledge of the world and the possibility of an immaterial substance or a zombie, or a free will, or an ens realissimum, even if we have sufficient objective grounds for positing their existence. So speculative arguments that begin or end with such things (Descartes' Real Distinction argument, contemporary conceivability arguments for dualism, the ontological argument, and even Kant's own possibility proof) are ruled out of epistemic bounds, even if they satisfy (i)-(iv). This is the result we wanted, and it indicates that condition (v**) interpreted as a positive coherence condition is a prime candidate for inclusion in a unified account of Kantian knowledge.
F. Hope, Belief, and the Canon again
In the Discipline, as we have seen, Kant's main goal is to dash the hopes of traditional metaphysicians by showing that their speculations about things-in-themselves cannot result in knowledge. He also argues that opponents of traditional metaphysics overreach when they claim, equally dogmatically, that a disproof of speculative theses is in the offing. The proper attitude, in a theoretical-epistemic context at least, is suspension of assent, together with a little bravado:
Thus, think up for yourself the objections which have not yet even occurred to your opponent, and even lend him the weapons or concede him the most favorable position that he can desire. There is nothing in this to fear, and much to hope, namely that you will come into a possession that can never be attacked in the future. (A778/B806) Kant goes on to say more about that secure "possession" in the Canon and the second Critique. Because the needs to which metaphysical speculation respond are rational and legitimate, we can reasonably hope that at least some of them will be fulfilled in a non-epistemic context. In the end Kant is famously willing to endorse both hope and full-blown "belief" (Vernunftglaube) that is based on "subjective" grounds.
Most of these subjective grounds are moral:
Thus without a God and a world that is now not visible to us but is hoped for, the majestic ideas of morality are, to be sure, objects of approbation and admiration but not incentives for resolve and realization, because they would not fulfill the whole end that is natural for every rational being and determined a priori and necessarily through the very same pure reason. (A813/B841) But as mentioned earlier Kant also speaks in the Canon of "doctrinal" forms of belief (Glaube). The latter "must not be called practical" but rather "theoretical," and it is often directed towards traditional objects of speculation: the existence of God and "the future life of the human soul" (A826-7/B854-5). Moreover, when doctrinal belief is formed for the right "subjective" reasons -in this case as a response to our speculative need to find ultimate explanations -it is fully rational. 22 This is presumably why Kant says, even in the Discipline, that "as far as the critique of the grounds of proof of the dogmatic affirmations is concerned, one can very well concede it all without thereby giving up those propositions [about the existence of God and the soul], which still have at least the interest of reason in their behalf, to which their opponent cannot appeal at all" (A741/B769).
Interestingly, Kant thinks doctrinal belief is rational even though it doesn't meet the modal condition that he places on both opinion and knowledge. The same thing goes for moral belief:
[T]here is a ground of assent that is, in comparison with speculative reason, merely subjective but that is yet objectively valid for a reason equally pure but practical … objective reality is given to the ideas of God and immortality and a Critique can be used, in conjunction with a disciplined "plan," to build a secure edifice of systematic knowledge, and yet still leave room for metaphysics in the mode of both hope and belief. 
